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This paper studies imperfect price competition between two intermediaries in an electronic business-to-business 
matching market with indirect network externalities. The intermediaries differ with regard to their ownership structure: 
an independent third party incumbent marketplace competes with a challenging collaborative buy-side consortium 
marketplace in terms of attracting buying and selling firms. When firms can register exclusively with at most one 
intermediary, the incumbent is only able to deter entry if the number of firms taking ownership in the consortium is 
sufficiently small. Otherwise, the consortium can successfully enter and monopolize the market. When firms can multi-
home, i.e. they register simultaneously with both intermediaries, the consortium can always enter while both 
intermediaries stay in the market with positive profits. 
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After the slow-down of the ¯rst wave initial hype associated with commercial internet
activities between companies and consumers (business-to-consumer or B2C electronic
commerce), in recent years the focus of electronic commerce has tended to be on elec-
tronic transactions and relationships between companies (business-to-business or B2B
e-commerce) which have consequently attracted considerable interest and investment
capital. The transaction volume as well as the growth potential is indeed much higher
in B2B than in B2C e-commerce, i.e. following the UNCTAD (2002) the former ac-
counts for around 95 % of all e-commerce in most estimates. Several sources, such as
the Gartner Group and Forrester Research, coincide in predicting an intense growth
potential of the worldwide B2B volume from around $433 billion in 2000 to already
more than $1 trillion in 2004. Around 37% of this total volume will be done via B2B
marketplaces acting as intermediaries in two-sided buyer-seller markets.1
However, despite this promising overall outlook of B2B e-commerce, especially the
future of independent marketplaces is highly questionable. Over 400 B2B marketplaces
that were predicted a glorious future some years ago had shut down by 2001 and
only about 100 B2B marketplaces handled any genuine transactions in the same year.2
Mainly independent third-party marketplaces have begun consolidating by shutting
down or merging. Besides internal problems, such as lack of liquidity, one of the main
reasons for this decline lies in the increasing direct competition from upcoming col-
laborative (or biased) B2B marketplaces, which are jointly provided by industry com-
petitors3 such as Covisint, which is a joint buy-side platform of the car manufacturers
DaimlerChrysler, Ford, GM and Renault-Nissan, or the retailers' marketplace Glob-
alNetXchange by Sears, Roebuck, Carrefour and others. In fact, such consortia-led
marketplaces dispose of a competitive advantage in the positioning to generate trans-
actions since companies share the ownership while also being active participants in the
market. Contrarily, the owners of third-party marketplaces are no trading partners.
1See UNCTAD (2002) and The Economist, May 15th (2004).
2See Harrington (2001) and The Economist, May 19th (2001).
3See Davenport, T.H., et al. (2001).
2Accordingly, large or many owners of a consortium more easily attain critical mass of
participants.4 In turn this is crucial for an intermediary's prospects of success because
of network e®ects, which are typical for such two-sided buyer-seller markets.
This paper contributes a theoretical framework for analysis of the ongoing process
of de-intermediation and re-intermediation in the B2B landscape, re°ecting the consoli-
dated elimination of initially prevalent third-party intermediaries, together with market
entry of collaborative intermediaries. We account for the fact that a crucial feature for
a marketplace's prospects of success is its ownership structure. This happens by study-
ing the impact on market structures and participation incentives of buying and selling
¯rms when B2B marketplaces with non-identical ownership structures engage in price
competition in a bilateral matching market. I.e. we consider a collaborative buy-side
B2B marketplace, meaning that some buy-side ¯rms form a coalition to build up their
own marketplace,5 as a challenging competitor to an incumbent neutral intermediary
in terms of attracting participants from each market side.
In particular, we show that even if an incumbent, third-party-owned B2B market-
place has a reputation advantage, a challenging collaborative entrant is able to gain (at
least) some market share. When intermediaries compete in access fees and registration
is exclusively possible with only one marketplace, the entrant is able to overcome its
reputation disadvantage by monopolizing the market, whenever the number of ¯rms
that provide the collaborative B2B marketplace is su±ciently large. When the B2B
marketplaces are able to observe the occurrence of trade between two matched part-
ners, they can apply transaction taxes as an additional pricing instrument. In such a
situation the consortium can always enter the market. Furthermore, when ¯rms can
multi-home, i.e. they simultaneously register with both marketplaces, there is also no
pricing strategy that enables the independent incumbent to deter entry. However, in
such a scenario both marketplaces remain in the market and sellers multi-home whereas
buyers are segmented among both intermediaries.
4See The Economist, March 2nd (2000).
5Considering a sell-side instead of a buy-side platform would yield symmetrical results. However,
buy-side consortium marketplaces are most common in practice.
3These results are driven by indirect network e®ects. A buyer's value of participation
in a B2B marketplace increases with the number of participating sellers and vice versa.
Each participant is not only a consumer but also an input for an intermediary. There-
fore an intermediary has to attract a large number of participants from one market
side, say buyers, to ensure participation from ¯rms on the respective other market side,
while buyers are only willing to participate if they expect many sellers to register with
the same intermediary.6 Due to this particular market characteristic, intermediaries
apply pricing strategies that subsidize participants from one market side and recover
this loss on the other market side. In this regard, there is a crucial di®erence between
an independent B2B marketplace and the collaborative buy-side B2B marketplace:
besides providing intermediation services the latter already comprises some ¯rms that
participate in the matching process in terms of those buyers taking ownership in
the joined marketplace. Hence, attracting sellers becomes easier for the collaborative
marketplace because it can o®er an additional input at the time of entrance.
Related literature:
Excellent overviews on descriptive categorizations of B2B markets and on the impact
of the usage of B2B markets on transaction costs provide Lucking-Reiley and Spulber
(2000) as well as Garicano and Kaplan (2001). Of particular relevance to this paper is
the literature on intermediation and competition in matching markets. Bhargava et
al. (2000) apply intermediation theory in an electronic market context. They focus on
product di®erentiation and analyze the decision of an intermediary when aggregation
bene¯ts for buyers are present but do not consider a corresponding network externality
on the sellers' side. Fasth and Savary (2002) analyze an electronic B2B exchange
market and its dynamic evolution over time, showing that equilibrium prices within
a marketplace may not always decrease with lower search costs. Yoo et al. (2002)
concentrate on a neutral B2B intermediary's pricing decisions in the presence of
network e®ects. In contrast to our approach they do not model competition between
B2B marketplaces. Also bilateral matching is omitted in their model.
6This phenomenon is referred to as the \chicken and egg" problem. See e.g. Caillaud and Jullien
(2001, 2003).
4Matching in intermediated markets is a widely studied ¯eld in the literature. E.g.
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) examine a bilateral bargaining model under complete
information to show that middlemen may exist to reduce search costs in a market
with intermediation based on a time-consuming, stochastic matching-process. When
buyers have diverse levels of willingness to pay, and suppliers di®er with respect to their
opportunity costs, intermediaries can eliminate the uncertainty arising from random
matches in a decentralized fashion by posting bid and ask prices. Hence, they provide an
advantage over a decentralized matching market (see Spulber, 1996b). Spulber (1996a)
presents a model with several competing intermediaries, which act as price-setters.
Gehrig (1993) deals with intermediation in search markets. In his model heterogenous
buyers and sellers choose between direct trade on a search market and intermediated
trade, where a monopoly intermediary posts bid and ask prices.
Most related to this paper are the models by Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003),
who analyze competition between two ex ante symmetric third-party intermediaries in
a bilateral electronic matching market. Their main ¯nding is that there always exist
pricing strategies so that an incumbent intermediary can prevent entry of a competitor
if buyers and sellers have so-called \bad expectations" against the potential entrant, i.e.
they register with the incumbent whenever it is not a dominated strategy. They claim
that such a reputation advantage creates a powerful barrier to entry. We show that their
¯ndings do not generally apply when competing B2B marketplaces have non-identical
ownership structures. Moreover, our results go into the opposite direction, since in our
model the challenging collaborative entrant is able to exert a competitive advantage
despite bad expectations against it.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the assumptions of the model are
introduced in section 2. In section 3 we analyze intermediaries competing in access fees.
In section 4 we introduce transaction taxes as an additional pricing instrument. Section
5 deals with competition when intermediation services are non-exclusive. Section 6
concludes the paper.
52 The Model
The framework we use is a simpli¯ed version of the models by Caillaud and Jullien
(2001, 2003) where we introduce competition between B2B marketplaces with non-
identical ownership structures: in a bilateral matching market an independent third
party marketplace I (as incumbent) competes with a challenging collaborative buy-
side consortium marketplace E (as entrant) in terms of attracting buying and selling
¯rms labelled i = b;s, respectively. Sellers and buyers are each homogeneous popula-
tions consisting of a continuum of mass 1 of ex ante identical ¯rms, where the share
nEO
b 2 (0;1] of buy-side ¯rms build up an own collaborative B2B marketplace E for in-
termediation services.7 For each agent i there is a unique matching partner on the other
market side j with whom trade is valuable. The total gain from trade equals 1 in case of
a perfect match, otherwise the gain from trade is 0. Perfectly matched ¯rms follow an
e±cient bargaining process yielding a linear sharing of the trade surplus, with ui being
the type-i agent's share, such that ub + us = 1. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the buyers' and sellers' shares from trade (us;ub) are not too diverse so that for
all i with i 6= j, it holds that ui < 2uj.8 Firms cannot ¯nd their corresponding match
without a matchmaking intermediary k = I;E who provides a matching technology
that allows to process, select and use information on ¯rms on both sides of the market.
For simplicity, it is assumed that the intermediaries' registration and connection costs
are negligible.9 Now if ni · 1 ¯rms of type i, drawn randomly within population i,
register with matchmaker k, a j-agent ¯nds its match through this intermediary with
probability nk
i 2 [0;1]. The resulting expected utility for agent j from registration with
k then amounts to nk
i uj(1 ¡ tk) ¡ pk
j, with pk
j being an upfront registration or access
fee and tk being a tax conditional on the realized transaction. Note that the registra-
tion fee pk
j can be negative, which would represent a certain type of subsidizing joining
7Note that we consider n
EO
b to be exogenous since we are interested in the prospect of success of
such a consortium given that a certain number of participating providers already formed a cooperation.
Endogenous group formation of such a consortium will be analyzed in another paper.
8This assumption guarantees that no market side has an extremely dominant bargaining position.
9Implying a ¯x cost for installation of a marketplace would not yield qualitatively di®erent results.
6¯rms.10 On the other hand, we restrict the analysis to values tk with 1 ¸ tk ¸ 0 because
negative transaction fees would result in arbitrary pairs of ¯rms pretending to match
simply to collect the fee.11
3 Marketplaces competing in access fees
The basic model is of competition in access fees, when intermediation services are ex-
clusive, i.e. ¯rms can only register with one marketplace I or E, but not with both.
This may be because the data to build a ¯rm-speci¯c pro¯le in a database are consid-
ered proprietary. Or, an intermediary might establish exclusivity12 to impose a certain
guarantee for its e®orts in processing the users' demands leading to a transaction. In-
termediaries compete in access fees corresponding to a one-time joining fee which is
indeed considered to be the most applied pricing scheme on B2B marketplaces.
The game is of simultaneous pricing, where the incumbent I chooses its access
prices PI = (pI
b;pI
s) and E sets prices PE = (pE
b ;pE
s ). A resulting market alloca-
tion is then characterized by the allocation of ¯rms nk
i (PI;PE)i;k, which is the result
of a rational expectation market decision process by j-users, given any PI;PE and
nk
i (PI;PE)k;nk
j(PI;PE)k for j 6= i. An equilibrium comprises market allocations and
pricing strategies for each possible price system, so that prices are a Nash equilibrium
in the reduced-form pricing game induced by the system of market allocations.13 The
approach builds on the analysis of the entrants best response to the prices pI
b and pI
s set
by the incumbent I, by ¯xing the incumbent's prices and considering various pricing
strategies of the entrant E. Furthermore, it is assumed that users of both populations
hold favorable beliefs for intermediary I so that j-users think that nI
i = 1 whenever it
is not irrational for i-users to do so (whenever it is not a dominated strategy for i-users
to register with I). This can be interpreted as a certain reputation advantage of the
10A negative registration fee might be interpreted as a price below marginal cost. In case that this is a
large e®ect, the price can indeed be negative. This can be interpreted as the agent receiving free access
to the marketplace and getting additional services as e.g. installing customer data in the database.
11The reader is referred to Caillaud and Jullien (2003) who proof that focusing on the total transaction
fee instead of discriminatory fees for buyers and sellers, respectively, does not change results.
12See also The Economist, June 15th (2000).
13See Caillaud and Jullien (2001).
7incumbent. Now we consider that some share nEO
b 2 (0;1] of buy-side ¯rms build up
an own collaborative B2B marketplace E for intermediation services, competing with
I. This is only pro¯table if the expected utility from the joint provision of E, which is
supposed to be in equal shares, is higher for all ¯rms nEO
b than remaining at I, yielding:
nEO
b nE





b (ub ¡ pI
b) (¸ 0): (1)
The left hand side is the expected total pro¯t of the collaborative B2B marketplace,14
which is decomposed into the expected bene¯ts from trade by ownership taking ¯rms
nEO
b nE
s ub as well as expected payments nE
i pE
i from participating sellers and buyers,
respectively. The right hand side of (1) is the sum of the expected utilities of those
buy-side ¯rms nEO
b when staying at I. Note that nEN
b denotes buy-side ¯rms that
register with E but do not participate in its ownership. Hence, the total number of
buy-side ¯rms that participate in E is nE
b = nEO
b +nEN
b . Suppose inequality (1) holds,
then sellers cannot rationally believe that nI
b = 1. They hold (rational) beliefs that
nE
b > 0 and consider registering to E by comparing the expected utility at E with the
utility when staying at I and 0 when not registering with any intermediary. Hence,
intermediary E must charge prices so that
nEO
b us ¡ pE
s > (1 ¡ nEO
b )us ¡ pI
s (¸ 0) (2)
in order to convince sellers to register with E. The left hand side is a seller's expected
utility from registration with the new marketplace E, the right hand side shows the
utility when staying at intermediary I. Now, provided E adopts a pricing strategy so
that (2) holds, it is a dominant strategy for sellers to register with E and the remaining
buyers at I, namely nI
b, cannot rationally believe that nI
s = 1. They hold (rational)
beliefs that nE
s = 1 and must then consider registering with E as well by comparing
ub ¡ pE
b with ¡pI
b and 0 (if they do not register at all). So, with beliefs favorable to I,
maximal pro¯ts for intermediary E are given by
nEO
b ub + us(2nEO
b ¡ 1) + pI










14We assume that p
EO
b = 0, since a positive price would just be redistributed among those ¯rms
taking ownership in E.
8with ' meaning 'slightly bigger than'. Hence, for PI = (pI
s;pI
b) to be supported as
a dominant ¯rm equilibrium, it must necessarily hold that those nEO
b buyers cannot
pro¯tably leave I and build up their own marketplace E, so that it follows from (3)
together with (1) that an entry deterring pricing scheme would have to be such that
us(2nEO
b ¡ 1) + pI
s + (1 ¡ nEO
b )(ub + minfpI
b;0g) + nEO
b ub < nEO
b (ub ¡ pI
b): (4)
From that, it can be shown that there are only pricing strategies PI = (pI
b;pI
b) that
enable I to corner the market in a dominant ¯rm equilibrium, if nEO
b is su±ciently
small.
Proposition 1 In a scenario with exclusive registration and competition in access fees,
the independent incumbent is able to apply an entry deterring pricing strategy only if the
share of buyers taking ownership in the collaborative marketplace is su±ciently small,
i.e. nEO
b · 1
2. Otherwise, if the share of ownership taking buyers is large, i.e. nEO
b > 1
2,
the consortium can enter and monopolize the market.
Proof. The proof is relegated to the appendix.
This result is driven by indirect network e®ects. The higher the number nEO
b of
buy-side ¯rms taking ownership in E, the higher is the incentive for ¯rms on the other
market side (sellers) to switch to E. In the presence of bad-expectations against E,
the entrant would have to apply a so-called "divide-and-conquer" strategy15 to get a
positive market share. That means E would have to \bribe" sellers (divide) while re-
covering this loss on the other market side (conquer). Contrarily to the benchmark case
of Caillaud and Jullien (2001), where a challenging independent intermediary has to
subsidize one market side through negative access prices, in our framework the collabo-
rative marketplace E has an additional tool for attracting sellers since besides the mere
provision of a matching platform, the collaborative B2B marketplace already o®ers a
certain amount nEO
b of buy-side matching partners. This constitutes an additional in-
put for subscribing sellers who can expect to pro¯t from participation in E in two ways:
¯rst, their expected probability of trade and second a potentially negative registration
15See e.g. Caillaud and Jullien (2003).
9fee (bribe). Accordingly, the higher the share nEO
b of providing ¯rms at E, the higher is
a participating seller's expected matching probability and the lower is the bribe which
is necessary to convince a seller to switch to E.
Corollary 1 I can only sustain dominant ¯rm equilibria if nEO
b · 1




ub¡2us] this happens by subsidizing buyers with prices pI

















b / ub +minfpI
b;0g. In equilibrium only one intermediary is active with (weakly)
positive pro¯ts implying prices as speci¯ed above.
Proof. The proof is in the appendix.
In order to deter E's entrance, I has to create a strong bound to (at least) one
market side through the application of negative access fees. This creates an incentive
for ¯rms on the subsidized market side to stay with I and attracts ¯rms from the
other market side through the associated network e®ect. Note, that ub¡us
ub¡2us can only
take values 2 [0;1] if ub · us.16 Then I can successfully deter entry by E through
subsidizing buyers if nEO
b ·
ub¡us


















u - u b s
u - 2u b s
Figure 1: emerging market structures dependent on nEO
b
16This is due to the assumption that uj < 2ui;8j 6= i. Moreover, n
EO
b can only take values 2 [0;
1
2]
in such a situation. See the appendix.
10If nEO
b is su±ciently small, i.e. less (or equal) than
ub¡us
ub¡2us, the subsidy received
at I is a su±cient incentive for those ¯rms nEO
b to stay with I. In other words, there
are too few ¯rms that would take ownership in E so that the comparative advantage
in terms of having already some buy-side ¯rms at E is outbalanced by the buy-side
subsidy at I so that building up an own marketplace E cannot be pro¯table. On the
other hand, if nEO
b > ub¡us
ub¡2us, then I cannot deter entry by subsidizing buyers. This is
because subsidizing buyers reduces E's cost of attracting sellers. Even if those buy-side
¯rms nEO
b would forgo the subsidy at I when building up E, this is not enough to
compensate the potential gains from the build-up of E. Since sellers would have to
pay positive access fees at I, they could be attracted at a relatively cheap price by
E, whenever nEO
b is large enough. This is because the higher nEO
b the higher is the
probability for a seller to meet its match at E.
If in turn ub > us,17 then I can only deter entry by subsidizing sellers (as long as
nEO
b · 1
2). This is because in such a case, the sellers share from trade us is too small
so that I could recover a buy-side subsidy through positive access fees pI
s. This means
pI
s would have to be higher than us, but then no sell-side ¯rm would register with I.
Accordingly, subsidizing sellers is a good strategy for I because with only few ¯rms
nEO
b at E, sellers' incentive from having already some potential matching partners at
E cannot compensate for the subsidy which sellers would forgo when leaving I.
4 Competition with access fees and transaction taxes
Let us extend the analysis by introducing transaction fees tk as a further pricing in-
strument. It is assumed that intermediaries can observe and verify whether trade takes
place but not the exact transaction price, so that the transaction fee depends on the
occurrence of trade only. Such a fee is supposed to be paid by ¯rms ex post after a
transaction between two matched partners takes place. Hence, the net surplus to be
shared among matched partners is (1 ¡ tk) ¸ 0. We impose transaction fees to be
(weakly) positive, so that 1 ¸ tk ¸ 0, because negative transaction fees would result in
17In this case,
ub¡us
ub¡2us < 0, so that the critical value would lie to the left of 0 in ¯gure 1.
11arbitrary pairs of ¯rms pretending to match simply to collect the fee.
Indeed, the application of transaction dependent fees is widespread among B2B
marketplaces especially when the ful¯llment of transactions is observable. Caillaud and
Jullien (2001, 2003) ¯nd that in such a set-up the incumbent intermediary is able to
sustain dominant ¯rm equilibria implying zero pro¯ts. We show, that this ¯ndings do
not hold in case of competing intermediaries with di®erent ownership structures.
Again, we look at E's best response to the prices pI
i;tI set by I, when beliefs
favor the incumbent. E's entrance will only be pro¯table if the expected utility from
the collaborative B2B marketplace is higher for each ¯rm nEO




s ub + nE
s (pE
s + nE
b ustE) + nEN
b (pE
b + nE
s ubtE) > nEO
b
¡




As in (1), the left hand side shows the maximum pro¯t the collaborative B2B market-
place could make. This pro¯t is decomposed into nEO
b nE
s ub as expected bene¯ts from








s ubtE) from participating sellers and buyers, respectively. The right
hand side is the sum of expected utilities of those buy-side ¯rms nEO
b when staying
at I.18 To attract sellers, E would have to apply a pricing strategy such that there is
an incentive for sellers to leave I. Note that (given that (5) holds) there is already a
positive share nEO
b of buyers at E so that joining sellers can expect a positive matching
probability. Sellers join E, if the associated bene¯t is higher than staying at I, given
that nEO
b buyers left I to build their own marketplace E. This yields
nEO
b us(1 ¡ tE) ¡ pE





us(1 ¡ tI) ¡ pI
s;0g: (6)
The left hand side is a seller's bene¯t from switching to E, while the right hand side
is the maximum of the corresponding bene¯t from staying with I, and 0 as expected
utility from not registering with any intermediary. If (6) holds, it is a dominant strategy
for all sellers to switch to E so that non-ownership taking buyers have to believe that




EO = 0, due to the same argumentation as in the scenario with competition in access fees.
12nE
s = 1. Those buyers then have to compare ub(1 ¡ tE) ¡ pE
b as expected utility from
also registering with E, with ¡pI
b as expected utility from staying with I, and 0 as
utility when not registering with any intermediary. Hence, those buyers will decide to
register with E provided
pE
b ¡ ub(1 ¡ tE) < minfpI
b;0g: (7)




s z }| {
pI
s + nEO
b us(1 ¡ tE) ¡ (1 ¡ nEO
b )us(1 ¡ tI)+ustE
+(1 ¡ nEO






Note, that the achievement of the highest possible pro¯t for E always implies for E to
set the maximum transaction fee tE = 1, which can be applied without jeopardizing
the sellers' possible shift from I to E. Hence, (8) can be simpli¯ed, yielding
nEO
b us + ub + pI
s + (1 ¡ nEO
b )(minfpI
b;0g + ustI): (9)
A dominant ¯rm structure where I can successfully deter entrance of the challenging
consortium requires a pricing strategy so that E's maximal potential pro¯ts are less
than nEO
b [ub(1¡tI)¡pI
b] together with ¯rms registering with I (i.e. ui(1¡tI)¡pI
i ¸ 0)
and I's pro¯ts being non-negative: pI
s +pI
b +tI ¸ 0. It turns out that there is no pricing
strategy that enables I to deter market entry of the buy-side consortium. Hence, the
challenging entrant corners the market with positive pro¯ts.19
Proposition 2 With exclusive intermediation and competition in registration and
transaction fees, there is always a best response strategy enabling the collaborative buy-
side marketplace E to enter and monopolize the market.
The entrant's maximal pro¯ts are bounded from below by ¼E ¸ nEO
b us, involving the
price system: pI
b = ub;pI
s = ¡ub;tI = 0 and pE
b / 0;pE
s / ¡ub ¡ (1 ¡ nEO
b )us, tE = 1.
Proof. See the appendix.
19Since in such a framework there are multiple equilibria, we are particularly interested in the maxi-
mum pro¯ts the entrant could make given that the incumbent wants to minimize the entrant's pro¯ts.
13Again, this result is due to the feature that, besides providing intermediation ser-
vices, the owners of the collaborative consortium also participate in the matching pro-
cess. Compared to the benchmark case of an independent challenging intermediary
competing with an independent incumbent,20 attracting ¯rms from one market side,
i.e. in our case conquering sellers, is easier for the consortium E since sellers expect a
strictly positive matching probability. The possibility of applying transaction taxes as a
second pricing instrument bene¯ts the entrant. This is due to the following: given that
beliefs favor I, so that ¯rms register with I whenever it is not a dominant strategy to do
so, both pricing instruments are perfect substitutes in terms of extracting pro¯ts from
non-ownership taking buyers. For the potential entrant, charging a high transaction tax
tE = 1 allows E to extract an additional bene¯t from sellers since non-ownership taking
buyers pay this fee only by the share ub. Therefore, a high transaction tax reduces E's
cost of attracting sellers dramatically. When transaction taxes can be applied, it is not
possible for the incumbent to prevent that E attracts any trade because the share of
pro¯t needed to be forgone by I in order to protect a potential monopoly position is
too big, so that I could not stay in the market at (weakly) positive pro¯ts.
5 Competition with non-exclusive intermediation services
Now we relax the assumption that registration is exclusively possible with only one
intermediary. Firms might register with both B2B marketplaces simultaneously (\multi-
homing") in order to bene¯t from their di®erent user bases so to increase their matching
probability. The matching processes the two marketplaces perform are supposed to
be independent. We explicitly exclude ¯rms nEO
b that take ownership in E from the
possibility of also registering with I since this would hold obvious results: the bene¯t
which ¯rms nEO
b initially obtain at I could be used to pay a (incrementally) small
subsidy to ¯rms at E, so that all other ¯rms would subscribe with E as well. Therefore,
such a situation cannot yield a dominant ¯rm equilibrium where I can apply an entry
deterring strategy. But also when we exclude ¯rms nEO
b from the possibility to register
20See Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003) who show that in such a case the incumbent can sustain a
dominant ¯rm equilibrium only by making zero pro¯ts.
14with I, this result holds, which is in contrast to Caillaud and Jullien (2001), where the
incumbent can apply an entry deterring pricing scheme.
Proposition 3 In a scenario with multi-homing and competition in access fees, there
is no entry deterring pricing strategy the incumbent could apply. In equilibrium both
marketplaces are active and make positive pro¯ts ¼I = (1 ¡ nEO
b ) and ¼E / nEO
b .
Sellers multi-home, while non-ownership taking buyers register only with the incumbent
I. Equilibrium prices imply pI




b us and pE
b 2 [0;ub].
Proof. The overall pro¯t of E is still as on the left hand side in (1). Sellers will
now register with E, as long as the associated expected bene¯t is greater than zero,
yielding
nEO
b us ¡ pE
s > 0: (10)
The di®erence with the case of exclusivity is that here, ¯rms do not necessarily have to
leave I when registering at E. Hence, ¯rms might register with E as \second-home".
Accordingly, sellers simultaneously stay with I only if they expect (weakly) positive
pro¯ts given the share (1 ¡ nEO
b ) of remaining buyers at I, so that
(1 ¡ nEO
b )us ¡ pI
s ¸ 0: (11)
If (10) holds, the (1 ¡ nEO
b ) buy-side ¯rms have to believe, that nE
s = 1, so that they
will register with E, provided that
(1 ¡ nI
s)ub ¡ pE
b > 0: (12)
Note that nI
s can only take values 2 f0;1g: if nI
s = 1, I's pricing strategy is such that
all sellers stay at the same time with I, so that E tries to attract remaining buyers
as a second source. Hence, the only chance for E to attract those buyers (1 ¡ nEO
b ) is
by paying negative access prices pE
b , because those buyers get their match at I with
certainty. The case that nI
s = 0 means that all sellers leave I. Then E could attract
those buyers with prices pE
b < ub. Since we are interested in questioning if I is able
to deter entry and to stay in the market at the same time, the relevant case is I's
pricing strategy such that nI
s = 1. The non-ownership taking buyers (1 ¡ nEO
b ) will
15simultaneously stay with I, only if nI
sub ¡ pI
b ¸ 0. The maximum possible pro¯t for E
is then given by (almost) nEO
b (ub + us) = nEO
b . An entry deterring pricing strategy by
I would require this maximum pro¯t to be less than the utility the nEO
b buyers expect
when not opening E and staying with I, yielding
pI
b < ¡us: (13)
In a dominant ¯rm equilibrium with I being the only active intermediary, it must hold
that I makes (weakly) positive pro¯ts so that pI
b +pI
s ¸ 0. Since I can only stay in the
market when ¯rms from both market sides register, pI
s has to meet condition (11). This
is obviously a contradiction to (13) and I's zero pro¯t condition. Since E cannot pro¯t
from attracting non-ownership taking buyers, it is obvious that I stays in the market.
Equilibrium prices and pro¯ts then follow from the conditions above. Accordingly, in
a scenario where multi-homing is possible and intermediaries compete in access fees,
there is no entry deterring pricing strategy that enables I to remain the only active
intermediary. ²
Caillaud and Jullien (2001) show for the case of competition between two neutral
intermediaries that there are dominant ¯rm equilibria where the incumbent can prevent
the challenger from catching any market share. These equilibria imply zero pro¯ts for
I. In our model, such equilibria cannot be sustainable. When nEO
b buyers decide to
build their own marketplace, they can always charge sellers a positive access price
pE
s because the collaborative marketplace comprises already some potential matching
partners from one market side. At the same time the number of buyers at I is reduced
by nEO
b inducing a reduction of sellers' incentive to stay with I. Contrarily to the
scenario with exclusive registration, I can stay in the market. This is because E cannot
bene¯t from attracting non-ownership taking buyers (1¡nEO
b ) since this would require
applying negative access prices. Buyers staying with I expect to get their match at I
with certainty since all sellers stay with I as well (given that I applies a pricing scheme
such that (11) holds). Accordingly, those buyers taking ownership in E are the only
buy-side users of their marketplace.
166 Discussion
The paper at hand deals with the analysis of imperfect price competition between two
intermediaries in an electronic B2B matching market. The essential contribution is the
analysis of competing intermediaries that di®er with respect to their ownership struc-
ture in terms of the impact on market structures and ¯rms' participation incentives.
We consider a collaborative B2B marketplace which is owned by some ¯rms from one
market side competing with an independent \classic type" intermediary. This is to ac-
count for recent developments in B2B e-commerce, namely the formation of industry
consortiums for establishing business-to-business electronic marketplaces together with
the decline of independent B2B marketplaces. Many of the latter type were highly val-
ued during the initial technology-stock race at the advent of B2B e-commerce some
years ago, but recently they are often facing problems. One of the main reasons for this
development grounds in the increasing direct competition from upcoming collaborative
B2B marketplaces.
A key aspect of such intermediated markets is the \chicken & egg" nature, mean-
ing that buyers (sellers) are interested in registering with a B2B marketplace only if
they expect sellers (buyers) to subscribe with the same marketplace as well, in order to
meet the appropriate matching partner. The extant literature, e.g. Caillaud and Jullien
(2001, 2003), claims that in such markets intermediaries have to subsidize ¯rms on one
side of the market together with recovering the associated loss with the other market
side in order to attract ¯rms for subscription. We show that subsidizing one side of
the market is easier for a consortia-led intermediating B2B marketplace than for an
independent third-party marketplace. This is due to the feature that biased market-
places already comprise matching partners from one market side, whereas independent
marketplaces merely o®er intermediation and matching services. The availability of
di®erentiated ownership structures of intermediating marketplaces as proposed in this
paper deeply a®ects the market structure. I.e. the benchmark result of Caillaud and
Jullien (2001, 2003) where an incumbent intermediary is able to exert market power
does not generally hold in such a scenario. In particular, we show that even if the incum-
17bent has a reputation advantage, the challenging collaborative entrant is able to catch
at least some market share. When registration is exclusively possible with only one
marketplace and intermediaries compete in access fees, the entrant is able to overcome
its reputation disadvantage and monopolizes the market whenever the number of ¯rms
that provide the collaborative B2B marketplace is su±ciently large. The possibility of
applying transaction taxes as an additional pricing instrument bene¯ts the challenging
consortium. While being a perfect substitute to the application of access fees in terms
of extracting pro¯ts from non-ownership taking buyers, a high transaction fee reduces
the cost of attracting sellers substantially.
If ¯rms can simultaneously subscribe with both marketplaces, the buy-side consor-
tium can always enter the market. However, in such a situation both intermediaries
stay in the market with positive pro¯ts. Sellers then register with both intermediaries
and buyers that do not participate in the provision of the challenging marketplace stay
with the incumbent. Indeed, we can widely observe such market structures in the B2B
landscape where collaborative marketplaces comprise their owners as only users from
the respective market side. Because of coordination costs it is sometimes di±cult to
form a large pool of companies to provide a joint marketplace in practice. The bene¯t of
the collaborative marketplace comes in particular from a large number of owners. Ac-
cordingly, in industries where it is not easy to attract su±cient ¯rms to jointly provide
a platform, there will be greater opportunities for independent intermediaries.
The present model could be extended in various directions. In this paper we took the
number of ¯rms providing the collaborative B2B marketplace as exogenously given since
we were interested in how many owners would be necessary to enable such a consortium
to enter the market. An interesting extension would be to de¯ne the number of ¯rms
that engage in the provision of such a joined B2B marketplace endogenously. A further
topic would be to study collaborative marketplaces that are provided by ¯rms from
both market sides. This will be taken up in future research.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Note that (4) can be simpli¯ed, yielding
pI
s + nEO
b (us + pI
b) + (1 ¡ nEO
b )(ub ¡ us + minfpI
b;0g) < 0: (14)
The left hand side of (14) increases in nEO
b as long as maxfpI
b;0g¡ub +2us > 0, which
is always the case given our initial assumption that for all j with j 6= i, it holds that
uj < 2ui. In order to sustain a dominant ¯rm equilibrium, I's pricing decision has to
be such that I's pro¯t is (weakly) positive:
pI
s + pI
b ¸ 0: (15)
Consider the benchmark cases where nEO
b 2 f0;1g. The case of nEO
b = 0 is identical to
Caillaud and Jullien (2001) representing competition between two independent market-
places. They show that in such a scenario there always exists a price pair PI = (pI
s;pI
b)
that enables I to be the only active intermediary in a dominant market equilibrium.
In case that nEO
b = 1, meaning that all buy-side ¯rms provide the collaborative
buy-side B2B platform, (14) reads as
us + pI
s + pI
b < 0; (16)
which must be ful¯lled together with (15) under a pricing strategy for intermediary
I that guarantees that E cannot capture any share of either market. It can be eas-
ily seen that there is no pricing strategy PI = (pI
s;pI
b) that ful¯lls both conditions
simultaneously.
Accordingly, there must be a critical value nEO¤
b with regard to the existence of a
price pair PI = (pI
s;pI
b) so that there exists a dominant market equilibrium where I can
prevent E from attracting any trade. This critical value nEO¤
b is obtained as follows:
assume condition (15) to be binding, i.e. we consider the minimal possible pro¯t that
keeps I in the market. This requires one price pI
i to be (weakly) negative, in other
words, one type of ¯rms must be subsidized.
191. Suppose ¯rst that this happens with buyers, so that pI








b 2 [0;1] only if ub · us. In such a case nEO¤
b 2 [0; 1
2], so that it
is a necessary condition for an entry deterring pricing scheme that nEO
b · 1
2. If
ub > us, there is no possibility for I to deter entrance by subsidizing buyers since
then nEO¤
b would be negative in (17), enabling E to enter with any nEO
b 2 (0;1].
This is due to our assumption that 2us > ub > us.21
2. Now consider subsidizing the sellers' side by I's pricing strategy, so that pI
s < 0.
From (15) and (4) we then get the following prices, I could apply to deter entry
by E:
pI¤













Since a price pI





maximally be equal to zero so the maximal value for nEO
b that enables I to apply
an entry deterring pricing strategy is 1
2. On the other hand, subsidizing sellers
requires that pI




From that it follows, that I can only apply an entry deterring pricing strategy, if
nEO









2] this happens by subsidizing sellers. ²
Proof of Corollary 1
It follows from the proof of proposition 1 that depending on nEO
b the incumbent either
has to subsidize sellers or buyers in order to deter entry. We determine the according
price system as follows:
21Note that there is no loss of generality through assuming that uj < 2ui;8j 6= i. If in turn it would
be possible that ub > 2us, then n
EO¤
b would be bigger than 1 in (17), but then the left hand side in
(14) would be decreasing in n
EO
b , meaning that also any n
EO
b 2 (0;1] enables E to enter.
201. In the case of nEO
b 2 [0;
ub¡us
ub¡2us] the incumbent subsidizes buyers by applying
those prices that yield the maximal pro¯ts, given that E cannot enter. These
prices are obtained by taking pI
s = us and setting (4) equal to zero, hence solving
for pI
b = (nEO
b ¡ 1)ub ¡ 2nEO
b us. This yields (weakly) positive pro¯ts for the




b 2 ( ub¡us
ub¡2us; 1
2] the incumbent subsidizes sellers. Again, I applies those prices
that deter entry and yield the maximal pro¯ts. Taking the maximal value pI
b = ub
and setting (4) equal to zero then yields pI




2;1] the challenger enters and monopolizes the market (no ¯rms stay
at I). The prices pE
s / us(2nEO
b ¡ 1) + pI
s and pE
b / ub + minfpI
b;0g then yield
(weakly) positive pro¯ts for E.
Accordingly, in the ¯rst two cases the incumbent can apply and entry deterring
pricing strategy yielding at least zero pro¯ts; in the third case this is not possible. ²
Proof of Proposition 2




b + tI ¸ 0: (20)
Additionally an entry deterring pricing strategy by I requires E's maximal potential
pro¯ts to be (weakly) lower than nEO





b + (1 ¡ nEO
b ) min(pI
b;0) + nEO
b (1 ¡ tI)(us ¡ ub) + ustI · 0:(21)




b + (1 ¡ nEO
b ) min(pI
b;0) + nEO
b (us ¡ ub) · 0: (22)
We have to distinguish to cases with respect to pI
b:
1. For the case pI




b (us ¡ ub) · 0: (23)
21It is obvious that there are no prices pI
i that ful¯ll condition (23) together with
(20) for any value nEO
b 2 [0;1].
2. If pI
b ¸ 0, I's pricing strategy has to be such that
ub + pI
s + nEO
b (us ¡ ub + pI
b) · 0: (24)
Only for nEO
b = 0, there exists a pricing strategy that enables I to deter entry.
Furthermore such a pricing strategy can only be applied, if ub · us. Then the
prices pI
s = ¡ub, pI
b = ub and tI = 0 enable I to deter E's entry but this involves
zero pro¯ts for I.
Since we analyze competition between an independent and a collaborative marketplace,
we are interested in strictly positive values of nEO
b ,22 so that it follows that there is no
pricing strategy that enables I to deter entry for any value nEO
b 2 (0;1], when interme-
diaries can apply transaction taxes as an additional pricing instrument. Accordingly,
any positive value nEO
b > 0 enables E to enter the market.
We are aware of the multiplicity of potential equilibria. In particular we are therefore
interested in the maximum possible pro¯t the entrant could achieve, given that the
incumbent wants to minimize this pro¯t. To determine this lower bound, we consider
the incumbents pricing strategy such that (20) is binding. Minimizing the entrant's
pro¯t then requires the pricing strategy pI
i = ¡pI
j = ui, tI = 0. There are two cases:
1. If pI
b = ¡pI
s = ub, E's maximal potential pro¯ts determined in (8) yield nEO
b us,
implying prices pE
b / 0, pE
s / ¡ub ¡ (1 ¡ nEO
b )us and tE = 1.
2. If pI
s = ¡pI
b = us, E's maximal potential pro¯ts determined in (8) yield 2nEO
b us+
nb, implying prices pE
b / ¡us, pE
s / nEO
b us and tE = 1.
Since 2nEO
b us + nb > nEO
b us, the ¯rst case determines the lower bound. ²
22The case of n
EO
b = 0 corresponds to E being and independent marketplace. See Caillaud and
Jullien (2001).
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